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This paper develops a simulation model of the behaviour of clusters in the face of bifurcation events 
in their environment. Bifurcations are understood as the regional equivalent to Schumpeterian 
creative destruction. The model investigates the role of decentralisation and co-ordination for the 
likelihood of successful adaptation by comparing adaptive performance of clusters exhibiting 
different degrees of decentralisation and alternative modes of co-ordination. Using Kauffman’s 
(1993) N/K model, it is found that there is an optimum degree of decentralisation with respect to 
cluster adaptability while different co-ordination mechanisms face a trade-off between speed and 
cluster-level optimality of results. In doing so, the model sheds light on an empirical controversy 
regarding the role of both factors for adaptation that has emerged between the Silicon Valley – 
Boston 128 comparison on the one and the Italian Industrial District experience on the other hand. 
Moreover, the identification of the roles played by decentralisation and co-ordination for cluster 
adaptability in changing environments could serve as guidance for future empirical research as well 
as policy initiatives.  
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 1.  Why? The case for cluster dynamics 
The phenomenon of non-random spatial concentrations of firms in one or few related sectors 
that are usually referred to as ‘clusters’ has become a hot topic in both economic theory and 
policy. Based on ideas first advanced in Alfred Marshall’s ‘Principles of Economics’ (1890), 
the existence of clusters is justified by permanent advantages accruing to co-located firms. 
The latter stem from agglomeration economies, which state that the co-location of many firms 
in an area improves – due to the joint conduct of complementary and competing activities – 
the local input and labour markets as well as the opportunities for inter-firm observation, 
collaboration and learning. Put differently, agglomeration economies create an 
interdependence between (the success of) cluster firm activities. As a result, they lead to a 
greater spatial embeddedness of agents: If being local is key to obtaining access to the 
benefits resulting from agglomeration economies, agents will be less willing to leave the area 
than they would be according to mere cost or other economic considerations (Robert-Nicoud, 
2004; Holmes, 1999). It is this generation of spatial inertia that has lead to the proliferation of 
clusters in theory and especially policy. In some instances, they are even viewed as an 
opposing force to globalisation, helping regions create or retain economic prosperity.
1 
 
What is often forgotten in the euphoria about the benefits of successful clusters to their host 
region is the fact that areas facing severe structural problems today (such as the old industrial 
centres of the Ruhr in Germany or Detroit in the US) were thriving clusters in the heyday of 
their industries. However, as the technological evolution progressed, agents in these clusters 
proved unable to adapt and were rendered obsolete. Put differently, “what once was a leading 
centre of dynamism within a given line of business [can end] up as an ‘old industrial region’, 
facing great problems of renewal and finding itself out-competed by firms located elsewhere” 
(Malmberg and Maskell, 2002, p. 432). This exhaustion of clusters is often brought about by 
bifurcation events (Maskell and Kebir, 2004), which could be viewed as instances of 
Schumpeterian creative destruction at the level of entire regions. Bifurcations include changes 
in technology, the nature of market demand or host-country legislation that reduce the 
competitiveness of the way production is carried out in the cluster to an extent
2 that implies a 
                                                 
1 For case studies of clusters see Brusco, 1982, Brusco, 1986, Brusco and Righi, 1989; Dei Ottati, 1994; 
Goodman, et al., 1989; Lazerson, 1990, Saxenian, 1991 and Staber, 1996. Uneven spatial distributions of 
industries at the national level are reported by Ellison and Glaeser, 1994, 1997 and 1999, Krugman, 1991 or 
Maggioni, 2002. A dynamic perspective on the development of a given industry’s spatial distribution is adopted 
by Audretsch and Cooke, 2001; Bresnahan, et al., 2001; Gertler, 1996; Mathias, 1983 or Rosenberg, 2002. 
2 This loss of competitiveness can occur relatively to firms in newly emerging sectors (Davelaar and Nijkamp, 
1990) or with respect to non-local competitors within the industry (Klepper, 1996). 
1 need for cluster agents to adapt to the new situation or leave the market. Bifurcations thus 
constitute events where current practice in the cluster has to change significantly to allow for 
its survival. As a result, there are many different possible development paths following them: 
Clusters can exhibit different levels of success in adapting or the bifurcation can constitute the 
starting point of a road to industrial decline. This intuition is also confirmed empirically 
where the response of clusters to bifurcations has differed: In some regions, a local industry 
survived or even prospered after events that lead to its decline in other areas.
3 In other words, 
there is no such thing as a deterministic life cycle for clusters leading from emergence to 
decline. Instead, at least in some cases, adaptation to bifurcations is possible. 
 
Against the background of the problems found in the many old industrial areas worldwide, a 
central issue therefore lies with the question of whether and when agents in clusters can adapt 
to bifurcations in their environment and thereby avoid decline. In this context, the very 
advantages of the cluster (agglomeration economies) can turn into liabilities: Their existence 
means that changes in activity by individual actors impact on the outcome of activities by 
others, i.e. individual changes in strategy can produce unexpected aggregate effects. At the 
same time, the cluster as the repository of these externalities has no formal authority over the 
decisions of local agents. In a way, the adaptation of a cluster to bifurcations could therefore 
be understood as a special case of decentralised problem solving (by local actors) under 
externalities: Agents need to change their activities to recapture their stance in the competitive 
environment. In part, the success of cluster adaptation hinges on the quality of these 
individual responses. At the same time, agglomeration externalities imply that the 
effectiveness of agents’ adjustments also depends on the (effects of) others’ actions. An 
interesting question in the latter context regards, whether there are any aspects at the cluster 
level that align individual activities with better collective outcomes than others. In analogy to 
the theory of the firm, one might ask if there are features at the cluster level that act as a 
version of dynamic capabilities (Teece, et al., 1997), favouring cluster adaptiveness by 
steering individual activities towards good collective outcomes. 
 
The question of how agents in clusters characterised by agglomeration externalities can adapt 
to bifurcation events in their environment has so far only played a minor role in much of the 
                                                 
3 For case studies of decline see Grabher, 1993, Isaksen, 2003; Meyer-Stamer, 1998, Saxenian, 1994 and 
Schamp, 2000. Successful renewal has been observed by Braunerhjelm, et al., 2000; Bresnahan and Malerba, 
1999; Cooke, 1997; Gertler, 1996 and Lee, et al., 2000. 
2 theoretical and empirical literature.
4 Whenever cluster adaptation has been investigated, no 
conclusive results were obtained. First, the intuition regarding the causality between different 
cluster-level factors and adaptiveness is usually left relatively implicit.
5 Second, much of the 
existing literature lies with contextual case study evidence, which does not readily lend itself 
to generalisation. In this empirical literature, furthermore, two opposing trends regarding the 
role of two cluster-level factors (decentralisation and co-ordination) for adaptation can be 
found. On the one hand, the comparison of the response of Silicon Valley and Boston 128 to 
the change arising from the introduction of the microcomputer (Saxenian, 1994), argues that 
the networks of independent firms in the former out-performed the large integrated enterprises 
of the latter. As such, it would seem that decentralised clusters with independent, small and 
medium sized firms have flexibility advantages in adaptation. On the other hand, research on 
Italian Industrial Districts (Cainelli and Zoboli, 2004; Lombardi, 2003) shows a development 
from such networks of independent producers towards more hierarchical structures 
(emergence of dominant firms or formation of business groups) as the environment changes. 
This phenomenon is often justified by the notion that having exclusively small firms in an 
area can hamper adaptability due to the need to co-ordinate and convince a critical mass of 
agents (Brusco, 1986). As such, the Italian case indicates, that clusters of small and medium 
sized enterprises might fare better in coping with change when they move towards more 
authoritarian decision-making structures. 
 
This paper addresses the question of the role of the division of labour and inter firm co-
ordination for the success of cluster adaptation and survival through a general theoretic 
model. It starts by linking existing theoretical and empirical insights to an understanding of 
clusters as complex systems composed of several agents conducting interdependent activities 
within the local value chain (section 2). Using Kauffman’s (1993) N/K model, simulations of 
the adaptive performance of ideal-typical clusters characterised by different degrees of 
division of labour (large versus small firms) as well as different co-ordination mechanisms 
(individualism, collectivism, alliances and dominant firms) are conducted. It is found that the 
mode of co-ordination matters for cluster adaptiveness, especially as the degree of inter-agent 
                                                 
4 “The hallmark of successful industrial districts is change and innovation, not stability and rigidity” (Staber, 
1996, p. 308), or: “Many of the available cluster studies in the literature have been focused on more static 
descriptions of their characteristics at a given point in time, although flavoured with evidence of some of the 
main features of their history.” (Dalum, et al., 2002, p. 2). Of course, there are exceptions from this rule (see 
Sturgeon, 2000 or Rowen, 2000). 
5 For instance, internationalisation of cluster firms is often mentioned as a helpful aspect in adaptation with 
different (mainly implicit) underlying rationales: Internationalisation can help firms observe very different 
practices than the locally dominant ones or it can serve as a means of reducing institutional inertia in the area 
(Ratti, et al., 1997). 
3 interdependence resulting from agglomeration externalities increases (as would be the case 
with a growing division of labour). Best performance in terms of outcome and stability of 
adaptive processes is obtained by ‘collective’ clusters composed of firms adapting for the sake 
of the cluster as a whole, while the ‘individualistic’ case (agents only adapting for their own 
competitiveness) performs worst. Alliance and leader firm modes of co-ordination deliver 
intermediate results. Their relative performance depends on the extent to which they account 
for actual externalities between agents. Alliance scenarios internalise a greater share of 
externalities than leader firm ones and thus initially out-perform them. With very strong 
degrees of interdependence in the cluster, the additional stability generated by having a 
dominant firm in the cluster however comes to offset this aspect, i.e. clusters with well 
connected dominant agents outperform those exhibiting alliance structures (section 3). 
Overall, the research indicates that there is an advantage for Silicon Valley types of clusters 
over more integrated ones provided interdependencies between agents are not too extreme. A 
move away from very collective decision-making mechanisms in favour of alliance or 
authority structures – as evidenced in the Italian case – leads to a reduction of adaptive 
performance. However, such a shift can be justified by a better results at the level of agent 
groups. Moreover, business or authority structures can be a good intermediate solution if the 
‘collective’ co-ordination mechanism cannot be enforced (thanks to a prisoner’s dilemma 
payoff structure with respect to individualistic versus collectively oriented agents). These 
intermediate structures can help avoid a spread of egoistic behaviour in a formerly collective 
cluster and thereby increase adaptive performance as compared to individualistic clusters 
(section 4). 
 
2.  How? The model 
The very nature of clusters as entities composed of firms and other local organisations whose 
activities are linked by agglomeration externalities implies a relatively straightforward role for 
the degree of decentralisation and the mode of co-ordination in their adaptation. Due to 
agglomeration economies, the success of individual firm activities hinges on the measures 
adopted by others. As a result, the likelihood of successful cluster adaptation depends on the 
degree of inter-agent interdependence. The latter is linked to the division of labour in the 
cluster: The smaller the number of activities performed by each individual firm, the greater its 
dependence on others will tend to be. With a growing dependence on others, the importance 
of co-ordination between agents increases as well. Co-ordination can then be achieved in two 
ways: Through ‘voluntary’ behavioural restraints exerted by independent agents or by 
4 differing distributions of authority between cluster firms. In both contexts, co-ordination aims 
at internalising the effects of cross-agent externalities into individual decisions. As can be 
expected, the effectiveness of any co-ordination mechanism will therefore depend on the 
extent to which it captures cross-agent interdependencies, i.e. the extent to which agents 
actually depending on one another are co-ordinating their activities. 
 
A formal model analysing the roles of the division of labour and co-ordination for cluster 
adaptiveness has to meet a number of requirements. First, it must link activities controlled by 
different agents, the interdependencies caused by agglomeration externalities and the resulting 
collective outcomes at the cluster level with some measure of success for different cluster 
configurations. Second, the model would have to include the creative destruction brought 
upon the cluster by bifurcation events in its environment. Third, an investigation of the roles 
of division of labour and co-ordination requires that the model be able to mimic different 
degrees of decentralisation (increasing interdependence of agents) as well as different co-
ordination mechanisms (diverging goals of agent activity). If all these aspects are included, 
the role of both factors for cluster survival can be investigated by comparing the adaptive 
performance of different cluster types. 
 
The N/K model (Kauffman, 1993) constitutes an analytical tool able to meet the requirements. 
Originally developed to describe the evolution of a population of genes, the model can be 
extended to a variety of complex, interdependent systems
6 since it describes the latter in very 
general terms by two variables: The number of system elements (N) and the degree of 
interdependence between them (K/ C). Each of the N elements can take on a discrete number 
of states (An). A frequent case is An=2, i.e. the N elements have two values (usually [0; 1]). 
This yields a possibility space of 2
N system configurations.
7 Depending on the environmental 
conditions of the system, each state of an element then contributes to the fitness (the 
likelihood of survival) of the system (Kauffman, 1993, p. 33). In other words, each element 
state (e.g. n1=0 and n1=1) has a fitness value wna, which is drawn randomly from a uniform 
distribution between 0 and 1 (e.g. w10=w(n1=0)=0.4 and w11=w(n1=1)=0.3).
8 The fitness of the 
entire system configuration (W(s)) is then determined as the mean value of the fitness 
                                                 
6 For a discussion on the link between clusters and complex system theory see Wolter, 2005. 
7 As an example, in a system consisting of N=3 elements with An=2=[0;1], one configuration is {1,1,0}. 
8 The environmental conditions determine the value of a specific element’s state for the fitness of the system. For 
instance, if the system described by N and K is the genome of a plant, one element N could be an allele enabling 
survival with relatively little water. This capability would contribute more to the fitness of the system ‘plant’ in 
an environment where water is relatively scarce. 
5 contributions of the different element states.
9 This formulation allows for a mapping of all 
possible system configurations and their fitness in fitness landscapes (Wright, 1931). 
 
The shape of these fitness landscapes then depends on two factors: The randomly drawn 
fitness values for element states (wna) and the degree to which interdependencies between 
elements exist. The nature of these interdependencies in turn differs according to the kind of 
system analysed. In the case of co-evolving systems where elements are controlled by several 
agents, interdependence can occur at the level of the agent or between agents. The first aspect 
– intra-agent interdependencies – reflects the phenomenon that activities might be interrelated 
at the level of the firm. For example, strategy choices in research, production and marketing 
are interdependent in the sense that firms need to align them to produce good results. If the 
system to described consists of one entity controlling all system elements (e.g. a firm 
controlling all aspects of its strategy Rivkin, 2000 or innovations Fleming and Sorensen, 
2001; Frenken, 2001), all interdependencies are of the intra-agent nature measured by the 
parameter K. The second aspect, inter-agent interdependence is a characteristic of systems 
where several agents control different system elements. They are measured by a third 
parameter, C. In both cases, the values of K and C indicate the average number of other 
elements influencing the fitness value of any system element. Put differently, if K=3, the 
fitness of each system element (on average) depends on the states of three other elements 
within the control of the same agent. If C=3, the fitness of each system element depends on 
three other elements that are controlled by other agents. The distribution of both types of 
interdependencies can however be uneven in the sense that some elements may be more 
‘central’ in the system (exhibit higher levels of interdependence) than others.
10  
 
The N/K model can thus link individual activities (choices of state for the elements 
controlled) by different agents that control a subset of the entire system with the 
interdependencies attributable to agglomeration externalities (C). By deriving a system 
configuration from the first and taking the effects of the second into account, the success of 
                                                 
9 Depending on the nature of the system, this assumption may not be realistic (Frenken and Nuvolari, 2003). 
10 A greater interdependency between system elements changes the appearance of the fitness landscape by 
increasing the difference in fitness values of relatively similar system configurations. If K(or C)=0, the fitness 
value of all elements only depends on their respective state. As a result, two system configurations differing by 
one element state only would have relatively similar fitness values (differing by the difference in fitness of that 
elements two states). If K>0, the fitness value of any element’s state in the system is affected by the states of 
other elements and vice versa, i.e. each element has A
K+1 different fitness contributions for different 
combinations of element states (Kauffman, 1993, p. 239). As a result, system configurations differing by the 
state of one element may differ substantially in fitness if that element has a lot of repercussions on the fitness of 
other element states. 
6 different cluster configurations can be measured in terms of their respective fitness. A 
bifurcation, i.e. a drastic change in the environment is represented by a reshuffle of the entire 
fitness landscape altering the fitness contribution of all elements while leaving the structure of 
interdependencies intact (Levinthal, 1997; 2000). 
 
Cluster adaptation to bifurcations involves having agents change the system configuration by 
modifying the states of the elements under their control. Combined with the interdependence 
effects resulting from K and C, this leads to different fitness values for the system. The 
adaptive performance of clusters can thus be measured in two ways. One involves the level of 
fitness obtained through agent’s adaptation effort. Another regards the fluctuation in cluster 
(system) fitness: Since clusters compete in a wider environment, very drastic falls in fitness 
would affect their likelihood of survival. Put differently, the gains from a higher fitness value 
obtained throughout the adaptation process might be offset by the losses incurred if fitness 
fluctuates (falls) substantially during that time. How agents change the states of the elements 
under their control alongside the interdependencies captured by K/ C thus shapes the 
dynamics of clusters when the latter are understood as systems in the N/K(C) sense. It is in 
these two aspects, that the division of labour and inter-agent co-ordination mechanisms can be 
modelled. Previous literature on N/K systems has found that their dynamics hinge on a trinity 
of factors: S
3 or structure, search, selection. These parameters can be altered as to reflect 
different extents of decentralisation and modes of co-ordination. 
 
The notion of structure refers to the shape of the system’s fitness landscape, i.e. the values of 
N, K and C. As has been found elsewhere, more complex systems fare worse in adaptation 
because “in functioning complex systems with many highly differentiated and tightly 
interdependent parts, it is highly unlikely that undirected change in a single part will have 
beneficial effects on the system” (Nelson and Winter, 1982, p. 116). In such systems, changes 
in individual elements that constitute an improvement for the latter’s fitness are increasingly 
likely to have adverse effects on the fitness of (more) other elements and are thereby more 
likely to decrease system fitness. It has been shown that very complex systems exhibit fitness 
landscapes with more (local) optima, with decreasing average fitness.
11 Very interdependent 
                                                 
11 As landscape complexity increases, average system fitness approaches the expected mean value of 0.5, 
regardless of system dynamics (the so-called ‘complexity catastrophe’, Kauffman, 1993, pp. 72-73). The fitness 
value of individual optima can however increase compared to less complex systems thanks to the increased 
number of random draws for ‘conditional’ element fitness values. 
7 clusters (high values of K and C) will hence fare worse in adapting to bifurcations both in 
terms of average fitness as well as fitness fluctuations.
12 
 
Hypothesis 1. The higher system interdependence (K/ C), the lower average system fitness 
and the higher its standard deviation. 
 
The complexity of systems in the case of clusters is a result of the degree of decentralisation 
in them. As has been outlined before, interdependency in clusters encompasses intra- (K) and 
inter-agent externalities (C). The latter are a direct consequence of the degree of division of 
labour or decentralisation. The smaller the range of activities conducted by individual firms, 
i.e. the smaller the number of elements controlled by an agent, the greater the number of C 
externalities for any given degree of element interdependence. In a way, a stronger 
decentralisation would therefore be associated with higher C values. In direct comparison, it is 
thus argued that very decentralised clusters perform worse than more centralised ones due to 
the overwhelming problems associated with optimising a system characterised by very high C 
externalities. Put differently, if the division of labour comes to be too extreme, being in Route 
128 is preferable. At intermediate stages (medium C values), however, more decentralised 
clusters might outperform more centralised ones since the smaller range of elements 
controlled by an agent (n) in decentralised clusters is faster and easier to optimise (2
n possible 
combinations) than the greater number associated with large, integrated firms. In that case, 
Silicon Valley is the better bet.
13  
 
Search regards the number of element altered by agents at a time. This number can vary 
between one (local search), several and all elements under the agent’s control (long-jump 
search). The nature of the search process is important for the number of ‘local optima’ of the 
system, i.e. the number of configurations that are not optimal in the entire fitness landscape 
but constitute the best attainable alternative given the search path chosen. If search processes 
only allow for a limited number of elements to be modified, they can be path dependent and 
                                                 
12 On the role of landscape complexity for adaptation in the case of firms see Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004; 
Levinthal, 1997, 2000 or Merry, 1999. 
13 To date, the model tests only indirectly for this aspect. Simulations were run for increasingly interdependent 
fitness landscapes, i.e. increasing C values with identical numbers of elements per agent. In a way, less 
interdependent systems thereby give an idea of the dynamics of more integrated clusters while increasing fitness 
landscape complexity points at greater decentralisation. Already, average system fitness values (see following 
section) hint at an optimum intermediate degree of complexity, i.e. there are limits to the benefits conveyed by 
decentralisation. Future research (see concluding section) will investigate this aspect more closely when 
simulating adaptive performance of systems with identical co-ordination mechanisms yet different numbers of 
elements per agent (different extents of decentralisation). 
8 may lead to lock in to local optima. This aspect is stronger, the lower the number of elements 
modified. The search strategy most susceptible to lock-in phenomena is local search 
modifying one element at a time. Especially in very complex landscapes (K+C approaching 
N), this search strategy quickly leads to lock-in since the number of local optima increases 
with landscape complexity.  
 
Selection in turn means the criteria that have to be met for a modification to be considered 
successful, i.e. it reflects different goals underlying agent activity. In the N/K model, fitness 
acts as the selection criterion: Modifications of system element states are only retained, if they 
improve fitness.
14 However, in systems with multiple agents engaging in decentralised search 
activity over the subset of the system they control, the level of fitness to be improved by 
search strategies can differ. For instance, agents could gear their search activity at the 
improvement of overall system fitness, i.e. “action would be ‘local’, while thinking would be 
‘global’ ” (Dosi, et al., 2003, p. 421). As a result, element modifications within the agent’s 
scope of control would only be accepted if they improved system fitness as a whole. The role 
of such different selection mechanisms (incentives) in adaptation has been found to exhibit a 
trade-off between optimality of solutions from a system perspective (higher for more system-
oriented selection) and the speed of fitness improvement (higher for more agent-oriented 
selection).
15 The model introduced here investigates adaptive performance for four different 
selection criteria, which reflect different agent goals underlying their adaptive moves  
-  Individualism: Agents seek to maximise their own fitness, i.e. that of the elements 
under their control, 
-  Collectivism: Agents want to maximise the fitness of the entire system, 
-  Alliance: Agents seek to maximise the joint fitness of themselves and their partner, 
-  Dominant (leader) firm: Agents aim at maximising their own and the dominant firm’s 
fitness while the latter behaves individualistically. 
 
                                                 
14 The notion of immediate fitness improvements through undirected search might not be as relevant for social 
N/K systems as compared to biological ones. For instance, one could argue that agents in social N/K systems 
engage in search and modification activity with a more long-term perspective, i.e. short term fitness losses would 
be accepted for sake of a long-term better search outcome (‘deeper’ search; Hovhannisian and Valente, 2004) or 
agents could use past experience to guide their future search (‘memory dependent’ search; Hovhannisian, 2004). 
At the same time, it is possible that agents refrain from improving certain system parts for the sake of optimising 
others (‘satisficing’; Frenken, et al., 1999) or seek pareto-optimal solutions by improving the mean fitness of all 
elements without decreasing that of any individual one (Frenken and Valente, 2003). 
15 This tradeoff is highlighted in the study of organisational change within the N/K framework (see Dosi, et al., 
2003; Dosi and Marengo, 2003; Marengo, et al., 2000 or Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2003). 
9 The origin of these different selection mechanisms could be justified by different forms of co-
ordination in the cluster. In the existing literature, the mode of co-ordination is a consequence 
of the local institutional infrastructure, the so-called local culture. Here, some local cultures 
are assumed to be geared towards generating a very collective mindset whereas others might 
lead to more individualistic orientations. If power in the cluster is furthermore distributed 
unevenly between agents, alliance or dominant firm scenarios can materialise. Please note that 
the model does not describe specific institutional setups within the local culture, but only their 
overall result with respect to what agents in a cluster care for. There are many possible ways 
of ensuring that actors adapt for sake of themselves or the cluster as a whole: Collectivism 
might result from a general lack of egoism, strong community and family ties in the cluster as 
well as a significant threat of being shunned or sued by other cluster agents when behaving 
egoistically (Holländer, 1990). 
 
The effect of selection (or co-ordination) for cluster adaptability will depend on three aspects: 
The existence of inter-agent externalities, the extent to which co-ordination accounts for them 
as well as the overall structure of the fitness landscape. The first point refers to the fact that 
selection criteria enabling some sort of co-ordination between agents will only become 
relevant if the latter’s fitness is interdependent, i.e. if there are C externalities between actors. 
If such cross-agent interdependencies exist, agents co-ordinating their activities fare better 
than those acting egoistically, especially as the role of C externalities increases. 
 
Hypothesis 2.  The performance of different co-ordination mechanism will differ more 
strongly as the role of cross-agent externalities (C) increases. 
 
In the presence of cross-agent externalities, the quality (performance) of any co-ordination 
mechanism crucially depends on the extent to which it captures the latter, i.e. whether or not 
the ‘right’ agents are co-ordinating their activities. Put differently, system performance will 
increase, the greater the share of C externalities captured by the co-ordination mechanism. 
 
Hypothesis 3. The greater the internalisation of C externalities through the co-ordination 
mechanism, the higher system fitness. 
 
Third, as fitness landscape complexity increases, the adaptation problems in highly 
interdependent systems (see structure) materialise. As a result, the internalisation of C 
10 externalities by different co-ordination mechanism might matter less for system fitness. In 
highly interdependent systems, partners aiming at increasing the fitness of a bigger part of the 
system might engage in an ongoing ‘dance’ where actions by one change the fitness of the 
other, provoking adaptation by another agent and so on. This leads to major fluctuations in 
cluster fitness. Co-ordination mechanisms ‘ignoring’ some C externalities might perform 
better thanks to a greater stability: Agents aiming at improving a smaller part of highly 
interdependent systems would lock-into a local optima more quickly as fitness landscape 
complexity increases. The additional stability offered by this phenomenon might come to 
offset the sub-optimality of system fitness resulting from an ignorance of C externalities. 
 
3.  What? Results and discussion 
All simulations were run using the LSD (Laboratory of Simulation Development) platform
16 
for systems (clusters) containing N=24 elements with increasing levels of fitness landscape 
interdependency, i.e. increasing values of the corresponding LSD parameter (EvenK). In order 
to avoid effects of one-off ‘lucky’ adaptations, 100 simulations with new fitness landscapes 
were conducted for each parameter. This corresponds to a cluster adapting to 100 bifurcation 
events. The simulations were run for a duration of 600 steps following the event. Average 
fitness values and standard deviations were gathered both at the system, i.e. cluster and at the 
(firm) group level for each simulation.  
 
Four different types of clusters compete for the best result in adaptation (figure 1).
17 They 
exhibit the same division of labour with four groups. Within each group, five agents control 
n=6 out of 24 elements. All agents search the fitness landscape by altering the states the 
elements under their control with a probability of 0.5.
18 They then test the fitness and 
(possibly) select the new configuration according to different criteria. The evaluation of the 
new configuration is done according to its expected fitness, i.e. holding the states of the 
                                                 
16 LSD is a freely available shareware programme allowing simulations even with limited computer experience. I 
am heavily indebted to Marco Valente for his guidance and support in developing the model. Interested users can 
find the programme online: http://www.business.aau.dk/~mv/Lsd/lsd.html. The downloadable package features 
code, user manual and a variety of example models (including N/K ones). All results and code of the model used 
here are available from the author. 
17 In total, simulations were run four nine different clusters out of which types 3-5 represent different alliance 
constellations regarding the groups involved while types 6-9 reflect different positions of the leader firm (in 
groups 1-4). See also appendix 1. For a better overview, only the results for the best performing alliance and 
leader firm scenario are presented here. Full results can be obtained in appendix 2. 
18 On average, agents thereby change three out of their six elements while occasional local and long-jump search 
steps are possible as well. This search mechanism reduces the extent of path dependence as compared to local 
search alone. 
11 elements outside an agent’s control constant. In a sense, agent search and selection activity is 
thereby  myopic as it selects strategies that would work well in the current context. Two 
aspects about clusters speak in favour of this perspective. 
 
The first regards the notion of bounded rationality of cluster agents with respect to the exact 
mechanisms underlying agglomeration externalities. In other words, firms might not know 
that their good innovative performance partly relies on knowledge spillovers provided by 
competitors. Second, even if actors do know that they depend on the activities of others, it is 
unlikely that any individual agent can determine the exact extent of his or her individual 
contribution to agglomeration externalities. For instance, an individual firm cannot foresee 
how an increase or decrease in its labour training activity will affect the pooled labour market 
in the cluster. This uncertainty is due to the fact the outcome of agent activities for the nature 
and extent of agglomeration externalities also depends on the strategies chosen by other actors 
in the cluster. It would be impossible for any individual agent to be fully informed about the 
plans and future strategy choices of everyone else. Selecting a strategy that will work well in 
the current context is therefore any actor’s best bet. This of course implies that individual 
activities may miss their goals or lead to entirely unanticipated aggregate effects. 
 
Figure 1: The model in schematic representation 
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Agents then engage in a bidding process at the group level to be selected as the new 
configuration representing their group at the system level. For each group, the agent with the 
12 best configuration regarding expected fitness of the entire cluster is selected, once again 
‘assuming’ that agents in other groups do not change their activities. This bidding process 
could be argued to represent the learning from observation that is prominent at the horizontal 
level of clusters, i.e. within each agent group (Maskell, 2001). A strong learning from 
observation would lead to a selection and imitation of best practice in each agent group. In the 
case of clusters where the success of firm activities is furthermore dependent on those of 
others, such best practice would correspond to strategies that work well in the context of other 
agent (group) activities. To approximate this aspect, the bidding process is based on the 
highest expected cluster fitness rather than individual agent or agent group fitness. While this 
may not necessarily lead to an immediate maximisation of agent (group) fitness when the 
latter is viewed in isolation, inter-agent interdependence makes adopting activities that work 
well within a given context of actions by others the most viable strategy for any cluster firm. 
The outcome of the bidding process is a new cluster configuration, which exhibits an actual 
fitness level that may well differ from the expected one. Agents can then engage in further 
search, test and selection activity in subsequent simulation steps. 
 
The difference between the model clusters then resides with their agents selection process, i.e. 
with the fitness level that has to be improved for a modification to be considered successful 
(see appendix 1). Four distinct cases are modelled: Populations one and two represent clusters 
with an even distribution of power. In the first population, agents care only about their own 
fitness when selecting a strategy whereas adaptation in the second population is geared at 
improving cluster fitness as a whole. In the third population, agents have formed alliances 
between groups 1+2 and 3+4 which aim at improving joint group fitness. The last cluster type 
exhibits one firm (located in the first group) that has come to dominate the others, i.e. all 
subordinate agents seek to improve their fitness and that of the dominant firm while the latter 
behaves egoistically, seeking to maximise its individual fitness. 
 
Simulation results were averaged over the 100 runs conducted for each parameter value. 
Comparing performance (mean fitness) and stability of adaptation (standard deviation) 
yielded a set of interesting results. First, evidence supporting hypothesis 1 is found: With 
increasing fitness landscape complexity, the average system fitness obtained through 
adaptation declines and the fluctuation in system fitness increases. This is hardly surprising 
considering that a greater number of interdependencies between agent activities makes it 
harder to optimise (parts) of the system since changing one element has repercussions on the 
13 fitness values of many others. However, the losses of system fitness differ between the co-
ordination mechanisms modelled, leading to a ‘scissor-like’ image of average system fitness 
(see also figure 2). For small values of C, all decision-making mechanisms perform relatively 
similar but beyond a critical value, a gap begins to open up with the collective population 
performing best by losing only 9.59% of its fitness value between the simplest and the most 
complex fitness landscape. The individualistic scenario performs worst and loses almost one 
third (29.55%) of its fitness. Both alliance and leader firm scenarios position themselves 
between these two extremes, losing about 20% of fitness as the complexity of the fitness 
landscape becomes maximal. This observation is in line with hypothesis 2: Co-ordination 
begins to matter as the role of cross-agent externalities increases.  
 

















































Throughout all simulations, the collective cluster performed best both in terms of maximising 
average fitness as well as minimising system-wide fitness fluctuations (figures 2 and 3). The 
individualistic cluster in turn began faring worst once the importance of inter-agent 
externalities increased beyond C=4.04. An interesting phenomenon regards the relative 
performance of alliance versus dominant firm clusters: As the values of C increase, the leader 
firm scenario begins to perform better than the alliance one, both in terms of average fitness 
as well as standard deviation of system fitness. 
 













































This shift in relative performance poses a puzzle since alliance clusters internalise a greater 
share of C externalities into agent decisions. According to hypothesis 3, they should thus out-
perform dominant firm ones. However, the opposite occurs in clusters with very central 
dominant firms (dominant firm in the 1
st to 3
rd group) once C>9. This is attributable to two 
special constellations in the fitness landscapes. First, increases in C imply an increasing 
centrality of the dominant firm in group one, which begins to receive and generate a greater 
share of C externalities (see also appendix 3), i.e. other groups in the cluster become more and 
more linked to the dominant actor by C externalities. Second, the behaviour of the leader firm 
stabilises with the complexity of its fitness landscape subset. As was elaborated in the 
previous section, search on more complex landscapes leads to a faster lock-in with local 
optima. As a consequence, the leader firm becomes less active in changing its configuration 
and thus causes less disturbance in cluster adaptation. 
 
Both effects work to offset the initial disadvantages of leader firm clusters as compared to 
alliance ones. What then causes their shift in relative performance is an additional effect that 
can be circumscribed as alignment of goals in dominant firm clusters. All subordinate agent 
search on an n=6 landscape and evaluate their modifications based on the aggregate of their 
15 own and the dominant firm’s fitness. As a consequence, they evaluate their changes on their 
n=6 subset and another subset consisting of the elements (n1-n6) controlled by the dominant 
firm. This second subset is identical for all subordinates, i.e. their evaluations are subject to a 
partial alignment of goals. In comparison, alliance clusters base their strategy evaluation on 
separate subsets of the fitness landscape (n1-n12 for groups one and two, n13-n24 for groups 
three and four), i.e. they lack an alignment of goals between alliances. This implies that the 
probability of finding stable configurations of the C related elements is lower for alliance 
clusters where agents try to optimise different yet connected subsets of the fitness landscape 
than for dominant firm clusters where subordinate agents try to optimise the same subset of 
the fitness landscape and ignore the externalities between them. 
 
Having seen that the collective case is the best obtainable scenario from the cluster’s 
perspective leads directly to the question of why Italian Industrial Districts are moving away 
from that decision-making structure. Three possible rationales exist for this phenomenon. 
First of all, industry structures need not be geared at optimality. Put differently, firms might 
have come to dominate the cluster or to form more closely knit business groups for a variety 
of reasons within a period of stability. If a bifurcation then hits the cluster, the latter is ‘stuck’ 
with its decision-making structure and the consequences this entails for adaptive performance. 
In a way, such a perspective would turn causalities around: Decision-making structures form 
through other influences and then have an impact on the adaptability of the cluster in the face 
of drastic environmental changes.  
 
However, even within the highly idealised N/K world, some notions could be advanced in 
favour of group and authority constellations as compared to the collective case. Previous 
studies employing the N/K model to the case of organisational adaptation have noted that 
systems targeting their search and modification at the optimisation of the entire system are 
bound to take longer than systems involved with decentralised search geared at optimising 
system parts. This is attributable to the larger problem space of entire systems as compared to 
their smaller parts.
19 The model presented here to date does not check for the speed of fitness 
improvement. This aspect could be accounted for by reducing the number of simulation steps 
and comparing the ensuring results: A lower speed in finding ‘good’ adaptation outcomes the 
collective system would imply that average fitness decreases and fluctuations increase with 
shorter simulations. 
                                                 
19 It takes longer to find an optimum in a problem space of N=24 with two possible states for each element 
(equalling to 2
24 possibilities already in the absence of interaction effects) than in one of N=6 (2
6) or N=12 (2
12). 
16 Table 1: Mode of co-ordination and average group fitness 
 Individualistic  Collective 
C  Group 1  Group 2  Group 3  Group 4  Group 1  Group 2  Group 3  Group 4 
0.67  0.74021 0.72711 0.72341 0.72405 0.75065 0.73130 0.73066 0.73480 
1.30  0.73321 0.73146 0.72241 0.73605 0.74574 0.73890 0.72549 0.74982 
2.33  0.75869 0.73424 0.71778 0.72164 0.75424 0.73891 0.73037 0.73332 
3.00  0.72625 0.70140 0.72601 0.77043 0.74098 0.72820 0.73268 0.77036 
3.33  0.74243 0.71363 0.69287 0.74319 0.74657 0.72040 0.73156 0.73269 
4.33  0.70960 0.69163 0.71242 0.70906 0.73351 0.72922 0.70919 0.73804 
5.33  0.69894 0.68292 0.69303 0.68972 0.72490 0.71338 0.71393 0.72402 
6.00  0.69998 0.69914 0.69194 0.69213 0.72029 0.71858 0.71866 0.71856 
6.50  0.66022 0.65744 0.67323 0.68141 0.70661 0.71302 0.72017 0.72162 
7.00  0.62246 0.62575 0.65667 0.68476 0.70552 0.70590 0.72192 0.72221 
7.50  0.59270 0.59284 0.63012 0.67618 0.68916 0.69571 0.70496 0.74488 
8.00  0.57094 0.57144 0.60452 0.68277 0.69103 0.69169 0.70492 0.73155 
8.50  0.56044 0.55942 0.58263 0.72636 0.67396 0.68799 0.71015 0.76077 
9.00  0.54747 0.54743 0.54709 0.77426 0.69037 0.68189 0.68045 0.77428 
10.50  0.53904 0.53950 0.53913 0.71673 0.68574 0.68600 0.67746 0.74776 
12.00  0.52996 0.53037 0.53060 0.65417 0.66943 0.68094 0.67271 0.73022 
13.50  0.52528 0.52425 0.52458 0.60428 0.66407 0.67500 0.67105 0.70176 
15.00  0.51791 0.51807 0.51898 0.56390 0.67794 0.67685 0.66932 0.66838 
16.50  0.51502 0.51510 0.51583 0.52647 0.67042 0.65476 0.66795 0.66912 
18.00  0.51343 0.51367 0.51355 0.51269 0.66550 0.67176 0.66407 0.66333 
 
  Alliance (1+2, 3+4)  Leader firm (in group 1) 
C  Group 1  Group 2  Group 3  Group 4  Group 1  Group 2  Group 3  Group 4 
0.67  0.74523 0.73523 0.73717 0.73127 0.75557  0.70339 0.72173 0.72380 
1.30  0.74850 0.73223 0.71915 0.75068 0.75467  0.70688 0.72051 0.73730 
2.33  0.75214 0.75074 0.70799 0.73484 0.75244  0.70850 0.71517 0.71828 
3.00  0.71935 0.72026 0.74210 0.77035 0.76824  0.64808 0.70664 0.74475 
3.33  0.74438 0.72758 0.71503 0.74525  0.76341  0.62881 0.74073 0.77076 
4.33  0.72914 0.70469 0.72196 0.73191 0.76819  0.62604 0.73328 0.71198 
5.33  0.72171 0.70427 0.72340 0.71858 0.77092  0.61780 0.71093 0.69709 
6.00  0.71585 0.73105 0.71433 0.71308 0.77308  0.62873 0.69138 0.69286 
6.50  0.70652 0.71297 0.70194 0.72726  0.78513  0.62785 0.67846 0.70398 
7.00  0.70529 0.70245 0.70612 0.72924  0.76673  0.63273 0.65661 0.72184 
7.50  0.69218 0.69300 0.71219 0.73212 0.75930  0.62928 0.63677 0.73612 
8.00  0.66969 0.67354 0.70363 0.72809 0.75124  0.61840 0.62738 0.73681 
8.50  0.64706 0.64790 0.68606 0.76181  0.74617  0.61687 0.61493 0.75696 
9.00  0.62163 0.61432 0.63809 0.77426 0.72174  0.61286 0.61234 0.77386 
10.50  0.61758 0.61934 0.62941 0.72888 0.71422  0.60917 0.60780 0.71955 
12.00  0.60833 0.61544 0.62134 0.68629 0.69955  0.59995 0.59749 0.67106 
13.50  0.60401 0.60286 0.60614 0.64899 0.67929  0.59022 0.59091 0.63615 
15.00  0.58969 0.58810 0.58884 0.61568 0.67191  0.57849 0.58297 0.60703 
16.50  0.59260 0.59398 0.59048 0.59360 0.66405  0.57510 0.58003 0.57332 
18.00  0.58022 0.57709 0.58061 0.57754 0.63426  0.56735 0.56055 0.56452 
 
Another interesting and more game-theoretic explanation of the phenomenon emerges from 
an investigation of the average fitness per group for each co-ordination mechanism. In this 
context, a shift in co-ordination mode could be explained if the collective case worked well 
for the cluster as a whole but not necessarily for individual firm groups: Agents in the latter 
would then have an incentive move away from the collective mode to one that increases their 
individual fitness. The results presented in table 1 however indicate that this intuition is 
17 insufficient to explain all shifts in inter-agent co-ordination. Being the leader firm increases 
fitness for all parameters as is apparent from the comparison of performance for group one in 
the collective and leader case (see italics in table 1). For some parameter values (see 
underlined values), certain groups also exhibit a higher fitness in the case of alliances between 
groups 1+2 and 3+4. However, no parameter constellation exists in which the alliance 
scenario performs better than the collective case for both partner groups. Instead, the 
collective case also maximises agent group fitness in most instances.  
 
Alliance or leader firm scenarios can however be viewed as a good intermediate solution in 
another context. If for some reason the observation and punishment mechanisms in the 
cluster’s local culture were insufficient to ‘guarantee’ a collective orientation by all cluster 
agents, the collective regime might be destabilised once deviants register (short-term) fitness 
gains in comparison to co-operating agents. It would be argued that in periods of stability, any 
deviation from collectivism could be discovered by its adverse effects on other agents and the 
cluster as a whole. The very nature of change however implies that this evaluation mechanism 
loses some of its accuracy. As the competitive environment changes to reduce the fitness of 
the cluster, individual agents could defect i.e. change their orientation and activity from 
collective to individualistic. To avoid punishment by other local agents, they would then 
ascribe the effects of their defection on other cluster agents to the change in the environment. 
 
To test for this intuition, the simulation model was extended to include the effects of egoistic 
agent and group behaviour in otherwise collectively oriented clusters. Simulations were run 
with an increasing number of egoistic agent populations (ranging from one to three) in the 
cluster. When comparing average group fitness in these mixed clusters with that found for the 
individualistic and collective case, a strong prisoner’s dilemma emerges. In terms of average 
fitness, any agent group has an incentive to act egoistically as being the only egoistic group in 
an otherwise collective cluster maximises fitness. At the same time, any cluster group suffers 
worst in terms of fitness if it is exposed to egoistic behaviour by its neighbour (defined as the 
group it was most linked to by C externalities). This fitness value is below that obtainable for 
the individualistic case.
20 In terms of group fitness, the following ranking therefore emerges: 
Egoistic>Collective>Individualistic> Egoistic neighbour. As a result, in the presence of any 
C externalities between groups, egoistic behaviour will spread in the cluster once one group 
starts behaving egoistically as it ‘infects’ its respective neighbour. One of the possible 
                                                 
20 Of course, results in terms of fitness were even worse when the group was the last collectivist in the cluster. 
18 outcomes of such a development would be a shift in cluster decision-making from the 
collective to the individualistic case. As the latter performs worst regarding overall system 
and group fitness levels, agents in the cluster might be motivated to form alliances or 
authority relationships, where the co-ordination mechanism is easier to maintain. This helps 
avoid the even deeper fall in fitness provided by a shift towards the individualistic regime and 
may well be more desirable from the cluster’s perspective than is usually acknowledged. 
 
4.  So What? Summary and conclusion 
This paper set out to investigate the role of decentralisation and co-ordination for cluster 
adaptiveness and survival. Modelling clusters as systems of interdependent agents and using 
Kauffman’s N/K model to simulate their performance (fitness) in adaptation to bifurcations, 
several interesting results emerged. First, findings indicate that there is an optimum degree of 
decentralisation: Initially, system performance begins to increase with fitness landscape 
complexity but beyond a critical level, it starts falling rapidly. This phenomenon is caused by 
a trade-off between the positive effects of element interdependence on system fitness and the 
negative results stemming from the difficulty of optimising very interdependent systems. As a 
result, one would argue that a decentralised Silicon Valley type of cluster would only 
outperform Boston’s Route 128 if decentralisation did not become too extensive.  
 
Second, the role of co-ordination mechanisms for cluster adaptiveness was included by 
modelling agents with different ‘goals’ and comparing the results obtained throughout their 
adaptation both at the agent group and the system level. It was found that the impact of the co-
ordination mechanism on adaptive performance increased with the role of cross-agent 
externalities. Regarding their relative performance, co-ordination mechanisms differed 
according to the degree to which they accounted for inter-agent interdependencies. The 
collective (full co-ordination) and individualistic (no co-ordination) cases acted as benchmark 
scenarios with the former performing best in terms of results and stability of the adaptation 
process. Intermediate forms of co-ordination involving only some cluster agents (alliance or 
dominant firm clusters) positioned themselves between these two extremes. Their relative 
performance could be explained by the extent to which they accounted for the actual cross-
agent externalities existing in any given cluster. However, the relationship between 
‘internalisation’ of C externalities and the performance of a co-ordination mechanism broke 
down in very interdependent clusters. Here, the dominant firm scenario began to fare better 
19 than the alliance one: While the latter allowed for better adaptation results by including a 
greater share of cross-agent externalities, the stability offered by a leader scenario ignoring 
some externalities came to outweigh its disadvantages regarding overall system performance.  
 
While performing worse than the collective case, alliance and dominant firm scenarios can 
still be more attractive than the former from a couple of perspectives, thereby providing one 
possible explanation for the shift in Italian Industrial Districts towards both modes of co-
ordination. On the one hand, the collective case performs best in adaptation from the entire 
cluster’s perspective, but does not necessarily do so for all cluster agents. Some might fare 
better (in certain parameter constellations) by forming groups or by attempting to become the 
dominant player. On the other hand, the collective case might be an unstable one. If local 
institutions are insufficiently strong to guarantee a corresponding mindset of all cluster actors, 
the collective case can easily deteriorate into the individualistic one – thanks to a prisoner’s 
dilemma payoff structure in agent group fitness. In order to avoid this, cluster agents might 
move towards alliances or dominant firms as more stable solutions guaranteeing a better 
adaptation to bifurcations than if every agent acts only in his or her own interest. 
 
The model developed here addresses the existing literature in a number of ways. On the one 
hand, it attempts to provide a more conclusive analysis on the factors that have been argued to 
help adaptation in case studies by showing when decentralised clusters out-perform more 
centralised ones. As such, the model aims at resolving an empirical paradox by showing one 
possible rationale for the contrast of the Silicon Valley–Boston 128 comparison with the 
Italian Industrial District experience. On the other hand, the results generated by the model 
could serve as means of guidance for future empirical studies by highlighting causalities 
between decentralisation, co-ordination and cluster survival that would invite further 
investigation. Second, the model extends the application of Kauffman’s N/K approach to a 
new class of social systems, which entails an important modification: Contrary to existing 
N/K applications, elements outside an agent’s control can enter his evaluation and selection 
mechanism. Third, the research introduces a more dynamic perspective of change and 
adaptation into the cluster literature where this issue has so far only played a minor role. 
 
While the model presented here generates a number of interesting results, it is not without 
limitations. Most of these regard its current setup and will be discussed as avenues of future 
research. However, two general points of note emerge. On the one hand, the model focuses on 
20 cluster-level factors steering individual activities towards good collective outcomes. 
Important aspects shaping agent dynamics are therefore not accounted for. Put differently, the 
model can show, which degree of decentralisation or which mode of co-ordination will work 
well for a system if its agents behave in a certain way. Issues shaping individual behaviour 
(e.g. organisational inertia or heterogeneity with respect to agent capabilities) are outside the 
analysis. Second, the intricate interdependencies between agents imply that model results are 
to be viewed as trends and averages rather than deterministic predictions. For instance, even if 
a cluster with a collective mode of co-ordination performs best in adapting (on average), other 
modes might get lucky in individual adaptive processes and out-perform the former. Put 
differently, within the 100 simulations run for each parameter, the relative performance of 
clusters in adaptation occasionally does not correspond to the results reported here.  
 
The results presented so far invite a number of interesting avenues for future research. One 
regards an analysis of the sensitivity of the existing simulation results with respect to the 
number of agents. In how far do simulation results change, if the number of agents in each 
group increases (e.g. from 5 to 10) or decreases (e.g. from 5 to 2)? It is expected that changing 
the number of agents will mainly affect the stability of adaptation processes. If there are less 
agents in each group trying new configurations of their elements, experimentation will shift 
from the agent/ group to the system level. Configurations that would not win the bidding 
process in larger agent populations could come to be the best configuration obtainable with 
less agents per group. As a result, the fluctuation of system fitness will increase. Another 
issue regards the role of the number of agents in the dominant firm scenario. Does the stability 
of the dominant firm scenario disappear, if a dominant group of five agents replaces the 
dominant firm in current simulations? It is argued that this is not the case: The stability of the 
dominant firm scenario in very interdependent clusters was attributable to the effects of C and 
K interdependencies outlined in the previous section. Both would remain unchanged in the 
presence of a dominant group of agents. Instead, in line with the aforementioned intuition on 
the role of agent numbers, the existence of several dominant agents can be expected to 
decrease the fluctuations in this group’s configuration, thereby exerting a further stabilising 
effect on the overall system. Both aspects were found to hold in subsequent simulations: 
While relative performance of co-ordination mechanisms remained unchanged, absolute 
performance increased with the number of agents. Similarly, results were robust with respect 
to changes in the extent of outside disturbances. Altering only part of the fitness landscape in 
21 a perturbation event did not affect the findings on the role of co-ordination and division of 
labour for adaptation (results not reported here). 
 
Beyond these more immediate tests, two additional avenues for future research emerge. The 
most important of these concerns the search mechanism used by cluster agents. As has been 
advocated in much of the literature applying the N/K model to the social sciences, random 
mutation is not a realistic search process for agents capable of conscious and deliberate 
activity. An interesting case therefore regards how the model’s results change if more 
elaborate search mechanisms are used increasing the breadth and depth of search, i.e. the 
number of elements modified on the one, and the long-term perspective of search on the other 
hand. A second aspect to be investigated more regards the role of decentralisation for cluster 
survival. It could be accounted for by having populations with different divisions of labour 
and identical co-ordination mechanisms adapt within the model. This would yield more detail 
on the extent to which decentralisation benefits cluster adaptiveness and under which co-
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25 Appendix 1: The populations 
Table 2: Populations and their co-ordination mechanism 
Pop. Label Co-ordination  mechanism 
1  Individualistic  Agents select strategies that improve their own fitness, i.e. agents in the first 
group take the fitness of elements n1-n6 into account when evaluating their 
strategy, those in group two care for n7-n12, etc. 
2  Collective  Agents select strategies that improve cluster fitness as a whole, i.e. all agents 
take the fitness of elements n1-n24 into account when evaluating their 
strategies. 
3  Group A (1+2, 
3+4) 
Agents form groups and select strategies that improve group fitness, i.e. 
agents in the first and second group take the fitness of elements n1-n12 into 
account, agents in groups 3 and 4 consider n13-n24. 
4  Group B  
(1+3, 2+4) 
Agents form groups and select strategies that improve group fitness, i.e. 
agents in the first and third group consider the fitness of elements n1-n6 and 
n13-n18, agents in groups 2 and 4 consider n7-n12/ n19-n24. 
5  Group C  
(1+4, 2+3) 
Agents form groups and select strategies that improve group fitness, i.e. 
agents in the first and fourth group consider the fitness of elements n1-n6 and 
n19-n24, agents in groups 2 and 3 consider n7-n18. 
6 Dominant  1
21  The cluster has a dominant agent located in the first group and all other 
agents try to improve that agent’s fitness alongside their own, i.e. agents in 
groups 2-4 care for the elements n1-n6 alongside those under their control. 
The dominant firm only cares for its own fitness, i.e. elements n1-n6. 
7  Dominant 2  The cluster has a dominant agent located in the second group and all other 
agents try to improve that agent’s fitness alongside their own, i.e. agents in 
groups 1,3 and 4 care for the effects of their strategies on the fitness of 
elements n7-n12 alongside those under their control. The dominant firm only 
cares for its own fitness, i.e. elements n7-n12. 
8  Dominant 3  The cluster has a dominant agent located in the third group and all other 
agents try to improve that agent’s fitness alongside their own, i.e. agents in 
groups 1, 2 and 4 care for the effects of their strategies on the fitness of 
elements n13-n18 alongside those under their control. The dominant firm only 
cares for its own fitness, i.e. elements n13-n18. 
9  Dominant 4  The cluster has a dominant agent located in the fourth group and all other 
agents try to improve that agent’s fitness alongside their own, i.e. agents in 
groups 1-3 care for the effects of their strategies on the fitness of elements 
n19-n24 alongside those under their control. The dominant firm only cares for 
its own fitness, i.e. elements n19-n24. 
                                                 
21 In the dominant or authority scenario, the group containing the dominant firm consists out of one instead of 
five agents. 
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    K C 












firm 1 (6) 
Dominant 
firm 2 (7) 
Dominant 
firm 3 (8) 
Dominant 
firm 4 (9) 
4 2.33 0.67 0.72869 0.73685 0.73722 0.72889 0.72962 0.72612 0.72839 0.72730 0.72701
5                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
2.50 1.30 0.73078 0.73999 0.73764 0.73189 0.73293 0.72984 0.72399 0.72612 0.72759
7 3.17 2.33 0.73309 0.73921 0.73643 0.72981 0.73213 0.72360 0.72554 0.72263 0.72886
9 4.25 3.00 0.72303 0.73281 0.73306 0.72314 0.73332 0.71693 0.72542 0.72918 0.71864
8 3.67 3.33 0.73102 0.74306 0.73802 0.73354 0.74217 0.72593 0.74200 0.72832 0.73136
10 3.67 4.33 0.70568 0.72749 0.72192 0.71543 0.72368 0.70987 0.71875 0.70999 0.71490
11 3.92 5.33 0.69115 0.71906 0.71699 0.70178 0.70773 0.69918 0.71020 0.69515 0.70489
12 5.00 6.00 0.69580 0.71902 0.71858 0.69605 0.69791 0.69651 0.69839 0.70353 0.70052
13 4.58 6.50 0.66807 0.71536 0.71217 0.68873 0.68786 0.69885 0.69876 0.69695 0.68511
14 4.33 7.00 0.64741 0.71389 0.71078 0.67646 0.68223 0.69448 0.69482 0.69104 0.67041
15 4.25 7.50 0.62296 0.70868 0.70737 0.67459 0.66676 0.69037 0.69061 0.68720 0.65036
16 4.33 8.00 0.60742 0.70480 0.69374 0.66373 0.66699 0.68346 0.69021 0.68219 0.62834
17 4.58 8.50 0.60721 0.70822 0.68571 0.66855 0.66405 0.68373 0.68310 0.68077 0.61782
18 5.00 9.00 0.60406 0.70675 0.66207 0.66709 0.65926 0.68020 0.67967 0.67778 0.60126
19 4.58 10.50 0.58360 0.69924 0.64880 0.65085 0.64337 0.66269 0.66135 0.66658 0.60036
20 4.33 12.00 0.56127 0.68832 0.63285 0.62572 0.63241 0.64201 0.64470 0.65105 0.58501
21 4.25 13.50 0.54460 0.67797 0.61550 0.61158 0.61924 0.62414 0.62933 0.62761 0.59007
22 4.33 15.00 0.52972 0.67312 0.59558 0.60021 0.59629 0.61010 0.61324 0.60829 0.57918
23 4.58 16.50 0.51811 0.66556 0.59267 0.58885 0.58046 0.59812 0.59370 0.59099 0.57100
24 5.00 18.00 0.51334 0.66616 0.57886 0.58349 0.57491 0.58167 0.57664 0.58532 0.58537
 
                                                 
22 ‘Pm’ corresponds to the value of LSD parameter EvenK. 
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firm 1 (6) 
Dominant 
firm 2 (7) 
Dominant 
firm 3 (8) 
Dominant 
firm 4 (9) 
4 2.33 0.67 0.01281 0.01029 0.00961 0.01328 0.01302 0.01366 0.01386 0.01269 0.01306
5                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
                   
2.50 1.30 0.01900 0.01309 0.01600 0.01953 0.01718 0.01955 0.01643 0.01617 0.01835
7 3.17 2.33 0.02814 0.01766 0.02036 0.02855 0.02327 0.02755 0.02168 0.01793 0.02378
9 4.25 3.00 0.03981 0.02002 0.02723 0.04128 0.02675 0.03169 0.02381 0.02656 0.03212
8 3.67 3.33 0.03712 0.01984 0.02429 0.03841 0.02437 0.02582 0.01902 0.02547 0.03849
10 3.67 4.33 0.05133 0.02120 0.02656 0.04428 0.03414 0.03402 0.02735 0.03197 0.03819
11 3.92 5.33 0.05751 0.02281 0.02546 0.05051 0.04817 0.03980 0.03678 0.03843 0.03902
12 5.00 6.00 0.05448 0.02306 0.02284 0.05302 0.05346 0.04118 0.04381 0.04185 0.04159
13 4.58 6.50 0.06959 0.02410 0.02894 0.06394 0.06146 0.04145 0.04197 0.04667 0.05237
14 4.33 7.00 0.07870 0.02582 0.03663 0.06904 0.06823 0.03825 0.04128 0.05167 0.06129
15 4.25 7.50 0.08347 0.02581 0.04126 0.07095 0.07368 0.04567 0.04477 0.05437 0.06737
16 4.33 8.00 0.08023 0.02656 0.04855 0.07428 0.07150 0.04815 0.04439 0.05620 0.07085
17 4.58 8.50 0.07488 0.02540 0.05961 0.07088 0.07325 0.04869 0.04967 0.05343 0.07008
18 5.00 9.00 0.06845 0.02134 0.07044 0.06723 0.06907 0.05204 0.04892 0.05035 0.06842
19 4.58  10.50 0.06830 0.02568 0.07315 0.07144 0.07514 0.05546 0.05805 0.05513 0.07252
20 4.33  12.00 0.06822 0.02644 0.07831 0.08128 0.07673 0.06330 0.06303 0.06155 0.07729
21 4.25  13.50 0.06888 0.02654 0.08101 0.08125 0.08192 0.06949 0.06623 0.06856 0.07793
22 4.33  15.00 0.06795 0.02762 0.08378 0.08692 0.08533 0.07276 0.07407 0.07512 0.08051
23 4.58  16.50 0.06803 0.02926 0.08570 0.08553 0.08683 0.07679 0.07692 0.07771 0.08278
24 5.00  18.00 0.06790 0.02982 0.08893 0.08611 0.08825 0.08082 0.08055 0.07644 0.07966
 
28 Appendix 3: Selected values of EvenK and the nature of fitness landscapes 
Table 5: Fitness landscape for EvenK=5 
  N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
w1  -   x   x   x   x                      
w2  x   -   x   x   x                      
w3  x  x  -  x  x                   
w4  x   x   x   -   x                      
w5 x x x x  -                      
w6       -   x x x x                
w7       x -   x   x   x                 
w8       x  x   -   x   x                 
w9        x  x   x   -   x                 
w10        x  x   x   x   -                
w11            -   x   x x x           
w12             x   -   x x x           
w13             x x -   x   x            
w14             x x x   -   x            
w15             x x x  x  -          
w16                 -  x  x  x x      
w17                   x - x x x      
w18                  x   x   -   x x      
w19                  x x x -  x      
w20                  x x x x  -     
w21                      -   x   x   x  
w22                       x   -   x   x  
w23                       x   x   -   x  
w24                       x   x   x   -  
  Group 1  Group 2  Group 3  Group 4 
   
K= 2.50  (60/24)
23 C=  1.33  (32/24) 
 
Table 6: Fitness landscape for EvenK=8 
  N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
w1 - x x x x x x x                  
w2 x - x x x x x x                  
w3  x x - x x x x x                
w4 x x x  -  x x x x                  
w5 x x x x  -  x x x                  
w6 x x x x x - x x                  
w7  x x x x x x -  x                  
w8  x x x x x x x  -                 
w9          -  x  x  x  x x x x          
w10           x  -  x  x  x x x x          
w11           x  x  -  x  x x x x          
w12           x  x  x  -  x x x x          
w13           x x x x -  x  x  x          
w14           x x x x x  -  x  x          
w15           x x x x x x - x            
w16           x x x x x x x -            
w17                  -   x   x x x x x x 
w18                   x   -   x x x x x x 
w19                   x  x  - x x x x x 
w20                   x  x  x - x x x x 
w21                   x  x  x x - x x x 
w22                   x x x x x - x x 
w23                   x x x x x x - x 
w24                   x x x x x x x - 
  Group 1  Group 2  Group 3  Group 4 
   
K= 3.67  (88/24)    C= 3.33  (80/24) 
 
                                                 
23 The value of the K (average number of within-agent elements influencing an element) was derived by dividing 
the number of intra-agent externalities (56-all black x) with the total number of elements (24). This yields 
K=2.33. Similarly, the average number of inter-agent interdependencies was derived from the total number of C 
externalities (16, bold x) divided by the number of elements (24), i.e. C=0.67. The K and C values for all other 
EvenK were determined accordingly. 
29 Table 7: Fitness landscape for EvenK=14 
  N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
w1 - x x x x x x x x x x x x x            
w2 x - x x x x x x x x x x x x            
w3  x x - x x x x x x x x x x x          
w4 x x x  - x x x x x x x x x x            
w5 x x x x  -  x x x x x x x x x            
w6 x x x x x - x x x x x x x x            
w7  x x x x x x - x x x x x x x            
w8  x x x x x x x - x x x x x x            
w9  x x x x x x x x - x x x x x              
w10  x x x x x x x x x - x x x  x            
w11  x x x x x x x x x x - x x  x            
w12  x x x x x x x x x x x - x  x            
w13  x x x x x x x x x x x x -  x            
w14  x x x x x x x x x x x x x  -           
w15                  - x x x x x x x x x 
w16                 x  -  x  x  x x x x x x 
w17                 x x - x x x x x x x 
w18                 x  x  x  -  x x x x x x 
w19                 x  x  x  x  - x x x x x 
w20                 x  x  x  x  x - x x x x 
w21                 x  x  x  x  x x - x x x 
w22                 x  x  x  x  x x x - x x 
w23                 x  x  x  x  x x x x - x 
w24                 x  x  x  x  x x x x x - 
  Group 1  Group 2  Group 3  Group 4 
   
K= 4.33  (104/24)  C= 7.00  (168/24) 
 
Table 8: Fitness landscape for EvenK=20 
  N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N N 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
w1 - x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x      
w2 x - x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x      
w3  x x - x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x   
w4 x x x  - x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x      
w5 x x x x  -  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x      
w6 x x x x x - x x x x x x x x x x x x x x      
w7  x x x x x x - x x x x x x x x x x x x x      
w8  x x x x x x x - x x x x x x x x x x x x      
w9  x x x x x x x x - x x x x x x x x x x x      
w10  x x x x x x x x x - x x x x x x x x x x      
w11  x x x x x x x x x x - x x x x x x x x x      
w12  x x x x x x x x x x x - x x x x x x x x        
w13  x x x x x x x x x x x x - x x x x x x  x      
w14  x x x x x x x x x x x x x - x x x x x  x      
w15  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x - x x x x  x      
w16  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x - x x x  x      
w17  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x - x x  x      
w18  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x - x  x      
w19  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x -  x      
w20  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x  -     
w21                      -  x  x  x 
w22                       x  -  x  x 
w23                       x x - x 
w24                       x  x  x  - 
  Group 1  Group 2  Group 3  Group 4 
   
K= 4.33  (104/24)  C= 12.00  (288/24) 
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